This paper analyzes the impact of di¤erent governance structures on the degree of Bank-Fund cooperation, focusing on the quality of their information transmission. It compares the performance of a decentralized governance with that of a centralized one. A centralized structure better addresses the necessity of coordinating policy actions, but greater consistency in policy actions will be achieved at the expenses of a less satisfactory adaptation to "local conditions." It is shown that when the need for coordination is relevant, a centralized governance allows to achieve a greater level of overall payo¤s. In the real world the governance structure of the two institutions is certainly decentralized. A testable implication of the model would then be to see whether BankFund's coordination is really important for their impact on recipient countries. The empirical evidence shows that a Bank-Fund simultaneous intervention is bene…cial to growth and that such bene…cial e¤ect is increasing with the willingness to coordinate of the two organizations. This evidence would then be in favor of a (more) centralized governance.
Introduction
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were originally created as two distinct and independent institutions with complementary tasks and di¤erent methods of intervention, within the framework of the Bretton Woods agreement (1944) . Over the years, however, their mandates have expanded in response to the changing realities of the global economy and the degree of overlap between the two has increased, leading to more room for both con ‡ict and cooperation. The importance of close collaboration between the Bank and the Fund is now a well recognized fact, which has also periodically been emphasized in a number of o¢ cial documents. 1 However, despite a series of o¢ cial declarations and agreements aimed at strenghtening Bank-Fund collaboration, it is widely believed that coordination still falls short of what could be rationally expected (Truman 2006 ).
More speci…cally, "information sharing" between the IMF and the WB is what still needs to be greatly improved. 2 This comes as no surprise since successful cooperation requires e¤ective transmission of information (communication) whenever information asymmetries exist. 3 Thus, investigating what factors in ‡uence the quality and the extent of communication between the Bank and the Fund has now become particularly relevant. Little theoretical and empirical analyses exist, however, about what circumstances may inhibit or encourage Bank-Fund communications. In this paper we contribute to …ll this gap by focusing on the factors that might inhibit (or enhance) the quality of information transmission between these two institutions and in turn their cooperation.
This choice is justi…ed by the fact that, as the reform agenda has deepened to include institutional and social reforms, the collection of specialized information by the two institutions has increasingly consisted in acquiring country-speci…c inputs. 4 "Local knowledge" is certainly crucial to the de…nition of economic problems and to their solutions, but it is often too messy, political intractable, and very di¢ cult to make judgments about (Wood 2006) . In other words, it mainly consists of unveri…able information ("soft"information). This paper explores the interaction between the incentives of IMF and WB to communicate information which is useful for the design of policy choices when there is misalignment of interests. The analysis is conducted within a two-sided incomplete information framework in which the transmission of information-assumed to be costless-between the IMF and the WB is soft
and cannot be veri…ed. Whenever the interests of the two organizations di¤er, however, the quality of their reports will depend on such con ‡ict of interests, with each of them expecting the information transmitted by the other to be distorted (cheap talk game).
Our key hypothesis is that such misalignment of interests arises whenever decision making involves a trade o¤ between the need of coordinating policy decisions and the need of adapting to "local conditions". A greater pressure for conformity, required by the need of coordination, may contrast with the objective of enhancing policy adaptation to the speci…c conditions revealed by each institution's specialized expertise. Within this broad perspective, this paper focuses on the comparison of two types of governance structures, relative to the quality of the transmitted information: "centralization"and "decentralization."We de…ne as "centralized" a governance structure in which the Fund and the Bank are not independent institutions but they both respond to an "headquarter"which centrally decides policies after receiving both the Fund and the Bank suggestions relative to their respective core area of expertise (vertical communication) . Under decentralization, instead, control rights over policies are retained by the two institutions (as in the current structure), and coordination between them is left to the discretion of their executive boards (horizontal communication).
The headquarter maximizes overall "payo¤s" (given by the sum of the Bank and the Fund objective functions), while under decentralization each executive board maximizes its own objective function. Contrary to the headquarter, the executive board of each institution does not fully internalize the bene…ts of coordination, since it does not internalize how its actions a¤ect the other institution. Therefore, a centralized structure better addresses the necessity of coordinating policy actions. This intuition, however, overlooks the fact that the headquarter is uninformed and must rely on the "specialized information" transmitted by the Bank and the Fund to take decisions. Di¤erently from a decentralized structure, where communication is crucial to improve coordination, in a centralized structure, communication is fundamental to improve adaptation. However, the misalignment of interests between the headquarter and the single institutions prevents vertical communication to be truthful. Thus, adaptation losses are always higher in a centralized governance than in a decentralized one. On the other hand, the decisions taken by the headquarter are not biased by the sel…shness of the two institutions, as it happens instead in a decentralized structure. Therefore, the coordination losses are always lower under centralization. Thus, in a centralized governance, a greater consistency between the Bank and the Fund policy actions will be achieved at the expenses of a less satisfactory adaptation to local conditions. However, when the need for coordination is relevant, as it should be the case for the IMF and the WB given their strong complementarities, we …nd that a centralized governance allows to achieve a level of overall payo¤s greater than those of a decentralized one. In conclusion, which governance structure is socially preferable critically depends on the relevance of the coordination needs.
In the real world the governance structure of the two institutions is certainly decentralized and, according to our model, in this case (horizontal) communication is jeopardized by the "sel…shness" of the two institutions which does not allow them to fully internalize the bene…t of coordination. Thus, improving communication would become fundamental to improve coordination. A testable implication of the model would then be to see whether variables measuring the IMF and the WB willingness (or ability) to coordinate may actually improve their impact on recipient countries. This circumstance could then represent (indirect) evidence in favor of the importance of their greater coordination. The empirical results show that a Bank-Fund simultaneous intervention is bene…cial to growth and that such bene…cial e¤ect is increasing with the willingness (or ability) to coordinate of the two organizations. Namely, the bene…cial e¤ect is increasing with the availability of the country's speci…c information (which decreases the asymmetry of information between the two institutions), with the importance of the multilaterals'speci…c knowledge (which increases the importance of Bank-Fund coordination) and with the "scope" of IMF's conditionality (which makes communication easier for the two institutions).
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some institutional information regarding the overlapping responsibilities of the IMF and the WB while Section 3 brie ‡y describes the related literature. Section 4 presents the theoretical model. Section 5 describes the empirical model and Section 6 describes the data while the results are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 summarizes and concludes.
IMF and the World Bank: synergies and con ‡ict
The World Bank and the IMF were created as two distinct and independent institutions with di¤erent tasks and methods of intervention, within the framework of the Bretton Woods agreement (1944). Up to the 1980s, the division of labor between the Fund and the Bank had been relatively straightforward. While the Fund's orientation was towards short-run macroeconomic stability, the Bank was oriented towards long-run development programs. At the same time the existence of synergies between the two institutions had also been recognized. Such synergies, however, became more important during the 70's and the 80's when, on the one hand, the IMF started to complement demand management policies by supply side policies and, on the other, the World Bank changed its policy towards a more explicit recognition of the importance of macroeconomic policies besides the traditional project and sector lending. 6 Moreover, during the 1980s, the Fund's lending became more concessional and related to structural matters and increasingly focused on lower income countries, those typically "served"by the Bank.
The …rst step toward a formal recognition of the importance of cooperation between the IMF and the World Bank was already made in 1966 with an agreement which explicitly laid out the primary responsibilities of each organizations and the procedures for the two to work together (Boughton 2001 ). 7 Then, in 1974, a joint ministerial committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund -the Development Committee (DC)-was established, in charge of assuring high-level coordination and facilitating intergovernmental consensus-building on development issues.
Lately, in 1989, a Concordat was signed by the IMF and the World Bank in which a vast area of overlapping responsibilities was explicitly identi…ed. In this common area, cooperation should have been pursued and strengthened: to this scope the Concordat did de…ne guidelines and terms of the World Bank-Fund interaction, and the mechanisms for resolving potential con ‡icts between the sister organizations. Both institutions committed themselves to systematically exchange information concerning low and middle-income countries. Moreover, the Concordat encouraged them to exchange this information not only within their 6 Between 1980 and 1984 energy prices were addressed in 46% of Fund supported programs, the mobilization of domestic savings in 54% investment planning and execution in 37%. These were areas of primary responsibility of the Bank. Similarly the Bank was increasingly concerned with many variables central to Fund stabilization program (Feinberg 1988 ) 7 According to the Dual memoranda of December 1966, the need for collaboration is made explicit by giving numerous examples of overlapping responsibilities: the structure and functioning of …nancial institutions, the adequacy of money and capital markets, the actual and potential capacity of a country to generate domestic savings, the implications of development programs for the internal and external …nancial position of a country (Gold 1982 Despite good intentions PRSPs revealed some weaknesses such as the asymmetry in the documents'operational importance in each organization, the lack of speci…city in outlining policy targets, and the failure to e¤ectively engage the borrowing government in the process. Most notably, this latter weakness with the PFP process underscored the need for more substantial country involvement and pushed the Bank and the Fund to acknowledge country ownership as an emerging priority of development cooperation. By many standards, country 8 In January 2010, three types of loans were created under the new Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust (PRGT) as part of a broader reform: the Extended Credit Facility (ECF), the Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) and the Standby Credit Facility (SCF). In particular, the ECF succeeds the PRGF as the Fund's main tool for providing medium-term support. 9 In the same year, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative was enhanced as a direct outcome of a comprehensive review carried out by the International Development Association (IDA) and the IMF. The initiative entails a coordinated commitment to reduce and forgive large volumes of debt to the poorest and most indebted countries. rights are allocated to an headquarter, should be preferred, although adaptation to local conditions will be always less satisfactory than in a decentralized structure. (i.e. the degree to which they consent to the domain of their respective activities in the division of labor). 13 Finally, an important implication emerging from this study is that
Bank-Fund consistency may not always be desirable. According to Fabricious, pressures for conformity might jeopardize "ownership" of lending conditions and thus he suggests that the Bank and the Fund should pursue a case-speci…c approach in deciding whether or not to coordinate.
A similar problem is also addresses by Hagen (2010) , who (theoretically) investigates how "ownership"could be a¤ected by introducing more or less donors'coordination. 14 Indeed in the case of multiple (uncoordinated) donors greater coordination (especially in the case of a "lead lender" and of a silent partner) could generate some pressure for conformity, which may contrast with the objective of enhancing recipients'ownership. In both papers a trade o¤ between responding to local conditions (i.e., improving "ownership") and coordination among donors, clearly emerges. However, the problem of what governance structure may better respond to such trade o¤ is not addressed. In this paper we propose to …ll the gap by applying the analysis of ADM and Rantakari (2008) to analyze the impact of di¤erent governance structures on the degree of Bank-Fund cooperation.
11 Some political scientists have addressed the issue of the e¢ ciency of the separation between the Fund and the Bank, arguing that these two institutions, while created for very di¤erent purposes, are nowadays indistinguishable and thus their arti…cial separation is ine¢ cient (e.g., Clark 1990; Crook 1991; Shultz 1998; Burnham 1999 and Fischer 2004) . 12 The main exception being the PRSPs which are prepared by the countries themselves together with the World Bank and the IMF. However, this only applies to low-income countries. 13 The evidence collected at the country level suggests that the most di¢ cult factor that both Bank and Fund sta¤ must overcome to ensure domain consensus is the di¤erence between the two organizations'operational styles (the Fund remains a highly centralized organization while the Bank has gradually decentralized its operations to the borrowing countries). 14 Öhler (2012) , for example, …nds evidence of a limited coordination e¤ort across regions and sectors among bilateral donors within a recipient country (Cambodia). 
The model
The model is that of ADM, appropriately modi…ed to deal with the issues at hand. More speci…cally, di¤erently from them, we assume that the two divisions (the Fund and the Bank in our context) are fully sel…sh. 15 We believe that this scenario better describes a situation in which the public evaluation of the two institutions' operations responds exclusively to their own performance. 15 The sel…shness of the two institutions might be explained by the circumstance that the career of both the Fund and the Bank sta¤ members depend on skills and e¤orts which are exclusively related to the performance of each institution. 9 
Objective functions
The trade o¤ between coordination and adaptation can be formalized by assuming that the Fund and the Bank have to minimize the following quadratic loss functions, respectively
and
where d The parameter 2 [0; 1) measures the relative weight of coordination losses with respect to adaptation losses. If the degree of competition between these two institutions is high, will be low, namely the two institutions overlook the need to coordinate their action in order to improve the adaptation to local conditions. On the contrary, if the gain from exploiting synergies is high, will be high. The degree of the "environmental volatility"which is faced by the IMF is given by the variance of 1 (i.e., 
Delegation versus centralization
Under a decentralized governance structure, control rights over d 1 and d 2 are allocated to the IMF and the WB, respectively. Each of them will take decisions to minimize its own loss function, overlooking the e¤ect which its own action has on the other institution. Thus, we assume that the Fund and the Bank …rst observe their local conditions, then they send each other messages m 1 and m 2 about the realization of their own state of nature, and …nally they take their decisions to minimize respectively E L F j 1 ; m 2 and E L B j 2 ; m 1 :
Under a centralized governance structure, control rights over d 1 and d 2 are retained by a central authority, the Headquarter (HQ), that is not informed about the local conditions. The HQ acts in behalf of global taxpayers and therefore takes decisions d 1 and d 2 to minimize the following loss function
Before taking decisions the HQ receives messages m 1 and m 2 about the realization of the two states on nature from the Fund and the Bank, respectively, and then it takes decisions
Decision making
We analyze decision making by assuming both a centralized and a decentralized governance structure. Under centralization, the HQ receives messages by the Fund and the Bank and
Taking the …rst order conditions of the expected value of (3) with respect to d 1 and d 2 ; and solving for the equilibrium decisions, it is possible to show that
where:
The equilibrium decisions are convex combination of the HQ's posterior beliefs about the states of the fundamentals 1 and 2 ; conditional on the vector m: When the importance of coordination increases and eventually when ! 1 the HQ sets
Under decentralization, taking the …rst order conditions of the expected value of (1) and (2) with respect to d 1 and d 2 , deriving the reaction functions and solving them for the equilibrium decisions, yields
where a =
1+
and b = 1+2 :
The Fund decision is a convex combination of 1 and its posterior beliefs about 2 (i.e., E( 2 j 1 ; m));and the Bank posterior belief about 1 ; (i.e., E( 1 j 2 ; m)). Similarly, the Bank decision is a convex combination of 2 and its posterior beliefs about 1 ; (i.e., E( 1 j 2 ; m)); and the Fund posterior belief about 2 ; (i.e., E( 2 j 1 ; m)): As ! 1; for given posterior beliefs, the decentralized decisions converge to that of the HQ, that is
in other words, as the need of coordination increases, the misalignment between the objectives of the HQ and those of both the Fund and the Bank disappears.
Strategic Communication
To improve coordination between their own specialized decisions, the Fund and the Bank can communicate the realization of their observed state of nature before taking action. However, the non-veri…ability of information (i.e., soft information) creates communication problems.
Under both organizational structures the information transmitted will never be truthful: indeed, there will always be an incentive for either the Fund or the Bank to exaggerate the realization of the state of nature with a positive bias if i > 0 and with a negative bias if i < 0; with i = 1; 2.
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Let us consider …rst the case of a decentralized structure. Let us suppose that the Fund sends message m 1 to the Bank: The Bank's expected response to message m 1 is given by
In this case, the Fund, anticipating Bank's behavior, will try to induce a higher "reaction" by the Bank, by exaggerating the value of the report about the realized 1 : It is straightforward to show that only when 1 = 0 communication will be truthful. The same argument applies to the Bank.
The incentives to misrepresent information exists also in a centralized governance structure.
Indeed, the HQ puts more weight on minimizing the coordination losses than the Fund or the Bank would like it to do. If for example the Fund truthfully communicate 1 6 = 0 to the HQ, it would expects that the latter would take decision d
which, from its point of view, would not be "extreme" enough, given that E( 2 ) = 0 and < a + (1 a)b: As a consequence, the Fund will exaggerate the realization of 1 by reporting
It is straightforward to show that only when 1 = 0 communication will be truthful. The same argument applies to the Bank.
The incentives to mis-report information are qualitatively the same in both governance structure, but it is possible to show that as the need for coordination increases (that is, as increases) the quality of information (horizontal communication) transmitted under a decentralized governance structure increases, while it worsens in a centralized governance structure (vertical communication). Intuitively, in a decentralized structure an increase in the need of coordination makes both agents more responsive to the communicated information, since they put less weight on adapting decisions to their own local conditions. This circumstance reduces the incentives to exaggerate information. In contrast, in a centralized structure, as the need for coordination increases, the HQ becomes less and less responsive to communicated information. This explains why the Fund's (or Bank's) incentive to exaggerate information increases.
Moreover, when = 0; the need to balance con ‡icting needs for adaptation disappears in both types of governance structure. In the case of centralization, vertical communication will be fully truthful, that is: m = ; d Therefore, the two governance structure will produce the same results. Finally, as ! 1; for given posterior beliefs, the decentralized decisions converge to that of the HQ, as in equation (8) above.
Communication Equilibria
We model the coordination game of an organization with two divisions where decisions must both be adapted to local conditions and coordinated with each other. Information about local conditions is private, soft and communicated by cheap talk. ADM show that all communication equilibria are interval equilibria in which the state space, i ; i , i = 1; 2, are partitioned in intervals, and each division reveals only which interval its local conditions i belong to. The equilibrium concept used is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE equilibrium consists of a reporting strategy 1 (m 1 j 1 ) for the Fund and a reporting strategy 2 (m 2 j 2 ) for the Bank, given a probability distribution over reports m i conditional on the 13 value of i observed, and a posterior belief functions g i ( i j m i ); satisfying 2 ) ; reported in (6) and (7)).
For an interval equilibrium to be incentive compatible, it is necessary that ,when the realized state falls on the boundary of two intervals of the partition, the sender must be indi¤erent between saying that the state belongs to either one of the intervals. This condition translates in a di¤erential equation whose solution de…nes the following family of incentive-compatible partitions a i;j+1 a i;j = a i;;j a i;j 1 + 4b h a i;j ;
and 14 ADM prove that the limit of strategy pro…les and beliefs as the number of partitions N i ! 1 is a PBE, and it is the most e¢ cient equilibrium, that is EL
is lower than in any other equilibrium. In such an equilibrium the size of the intervals is in…nitesimally small for i close to 0 and increases at a growing rate as the module of i increases.
The choice of governance
In this section we compare the expected losses for each governance structure. Under centralization, the HQ has got control over both the Fund and the Bank operations. Since its objective is to minimize overall losses, the decisions it takes are always …rst best, conditional on the information available. The amount of adaptation achieved depends on the importance of adaptation for the two institutions, which in turn depends on the quality of the information released. Instead, the amount of coordination depends on the overall value of coordination.
Let AL C denote the adaptation losses, that is
and let CL C denote the coordination losses, that is
Expected losses under centralization are thus given by
Under decentralization, the Fund and the Bank take decisions overlooking the e¤ects of their actions on the other's payo¤. Equilibrium decisions are thus biased with respect to the …rst best even under perfect information. Moreover, strategic communication leads to coordination failures over and above any inherent biases in equilibrium decisions. Let AL D denote the adaptation losses, that is
and let CL D denote the coordination losses, that is
15 Expected losses under decentralization are thus given by
ADM prove that the adaptation losses (AL) are always higher in a centralized governance structure, while the coordination losses (CL) are always higher in a decentralized governance structure, that is
Di¤erently from a decentralized structure, where communication is fundamental to improve coordination, in a centralized structure communication is fundamental to improve adaptation. But the misalignment of interests between the headquarter and the single institution prevents vertical communication to be truthful. This explains why adaptation losses are always higher in a centralized governance structure than in a decentralized one. On the other hand, in a decentralized structure, decisions are biased by the sel…shness of the two institutions, and strategic communication leads to further coordination failures. Therefore, the coordination losses are always higher in a decentralized structure.
As the need for coordination increases, the worse performance of the centralized governance structure in terms of adaptation to local conditions is fully o¤set by the better results that it can achieve under coordination. This is proved in the following proposition. Let f = 33 3 + 32 2 + 3 2 since the denominator of EL C EL D is always positive, it is easy to check that :
The proposition shows that a decentralized authority represents the preferred governance structure only when the need of coordination is very low. In this case, the advantages of a decentralized structure in achieving a better adaptation are greater than the disadvantages of a biased decision.
In contrast, a centralized governance structure should be preferred when the coordination need is above a given threshold level. The HQ is able to eliminate the bias arising in decentralized equilibrium, although the quality of adaptation remains always below of what can be achieved under a decentralized structure. This disadvantage, however, is fully o¤set by the better coordination results that a centralized structure can guarantee. As the need of coordination increases further, each institution becomes more willing to coordinate with the other. Thus, the dominant position of a centralized structure is "eroded"by the circumstance that even in a decentralized structure the decisions become less and less biased. To the limit (as tends to in…nity) the outcomes of the two governance structures converge to the same value. The same result is obtained when = 0 : in this case there is no need to balance competing adaptation needs: the absence of con ‡icting preferences allows then to achieve the …rst best in both types of governance structures.
The theoretical model provides normative indications regarding the optimal governance structure of the IMF and the WB. The theoretical prediction of the model is that when the need for coordination is relevant, as it is generally the case for the Bank and the Fund operations, a centralized governance structure allows to achieve a level of overall payo¤ greater than those of a decentralized one. In the real world the governance structure of the two institutions is certainly decentralized, nevertheless, the model allows us to derive some implications regarding the importance of greater cooperation between the IMF and the WB.
An immediate testable implication of the model would then be to see whether variables measuring the IMF and the WB willingness (or ability) to coordinate may improve their impact on recipient countries. This circumstance could then represent (indirect) evidence in favor of the relevance ot the coordination needs. We turn to the empirics next.
Empirical Model
In this section, …rst of all, we plan to analyze the e¤ects of a loan which is granted simultaneously by the IMF and the WB on growth we want to test whether this impact is in turn in ‡uenced by some variables which we take as proxy of the IMF and WB willingness (or ability) to coordinate.
We consider only the cases in which the IMF and the WB are lending simultaneously to a recipient country. We are well aware that being involved simultaneously with the same country does not necessarily mean that these two organizations are actually working together.
The Bank and Fund could lend simultaneously to the same country without any exchange of information as well as exchanging information also at a distance. However, ceteris paribus, it is plausible to believe that these institutions will be more likely to interact when simultaneously "involved"with the same country as compared to the case in which they are acting on their own.
In this paper, we consider the amount of IMF and WB disbursements rather than taking the number of projects, as in Marchesi and Sirtori (2011) . Since the e¤ects of a loan can be evaluated only after a few years from the disbursement, all our variables are averaged over three years. We then use data only restricted to countries which have received a loan simultaneously by the IMF and the WB, that is a maximum of 90 developing countries over the 1982-2008 period. 17 We then test
where G it represents per capita growth in country i at period t, L it denotes the sum of IMF and WB loans received by country i at period t; X is a vector containing our variables of interest, X L denote the e¤ect that our variables of interest have on the simultaneous impact of an IMF-WB loan and Z is a vector containing a set of control variables. Finally, i and t denote country and time dummies, respectively, which allow us to control for both countries unobservables and common macroeconomic factors.
To test the robustness of our results, we also estimate an alternative speci…cation using the full sample of countries, that is a maximum of 128 developing countries over the period. Speci…cally, we test the following equation
where L it denotes the sum of IMF and WB loans received by country i at period t; dIW is a dummy variable which is equal to one when a country receive a loan simultaneously by the IMF and the WB, L dIW denotes the impact on growth of an IMF-WB loan and X L dIW denotes the e¤ect that our variables of interest have on the simultaneous impact of an IMF-WB loan. 18 As above, X is a vector containing our variables of interest, Z is a vector containing a set of control variables and i and t denote country and time dummies, respectively.
We use a OLS …xed-e¤ect estimator with robust standard errors in order to correct for heteroskedasticity across countries. When estimating the growth regression by OLS there may be the problem with the endogeneity of both the IMF and the WB variables as adjustment programs are usually concluded in periods of economic crisis. For this reason, the coe¢ -cient measuring the e¤ect, of the program's adoption on growth can be downward biased as there may be a selection bias and obviously selection problems may also be related to the interaction term between IMF and World Bank programs.
Nevertheless we decided to use OLS to estimate both equation (2) and (3) 19 Moreover, our estimate of whether IMF-WB loans a¤ects growth is likely to be the lower bound of the true e¤ect, and we avoid to interpreting it in a causal way. We have, however, no reason to expect a systematic bias for the interaction terms with our variables of interest. Since we take disbursed loans (and not committed ones) we take contemporaneous (but three years averages) values of growth and disbursements (see Dreher et al. 2013b ).
Data

Control Variables
Our choice of control variables follows the speci…cation of Marchesi and Sirtori (2011) , which is quite common in the literature analyzing the e¤ects of both IMF and WB programs (and foreign aid). 20 Our selection then includes economic, institutional, and social variables. More speci…cally, we control for the log of GDP per capita at the start of each period, measures for human resources (life expectancy and fertility rate), investments as a percentage of GDP, a measure of openness (exports and imports over GDP), an index of democracy as de…ned in the Polity IV dataset (ranging from -10 to 10) and the CPIA index of the World Bank which 18 Since X L dIW is a triple interaction we need to control for each possible combination of the three variables.X; L and dIW . 19 Dreher et al. (2013a) and (2013b) and Kilby (2012) have all shown how that politically driven aid (and WB projects) have negative outcomes. For this reason political variables cannot be (anymore) valid instruments in aid (and loans) e¤ectiveness regressions. 20 Among others, see Barro and Lee (2005) , Dreher (2006a) and Rajan and Subramanian (2008) .
measures the quality of policies and institutions (re ‡ecting the Bank's internal evaluation of country performance and institutions). 21 
Variables of interest
Since we consider the role of the "domain consensus"in explaining Bank-Fund cooperation. 22 Finally, we control for the possible role of political factors in inducing more or less cooperation between the two institutions.
Importance of the local knowledge. The quality and the extent of horizontal communication is jeopardized by the relative weight given to adaptation to local conditions as revealed by each institution specialized information. However, if local knowledge is easily accessible and no specialized expertise is needed to acquire it, distorted communication does not represent a problem anymore. To this respect, we use the quality of information transmission as a proxy of the asymmetry of information between the two organizations. With a higher quality of information transmission it is easier to verify information and, therefore, to assess its relevance and importance for decisions and outcomes. As a consequence, as information asymmetry decreases, the cooperation between the Bank and the Fund should improve.
We use the number of telephone lines per 100 inhabitants (World Telecommunications/ ICT Indicators Database 2011) as a proxy for the quality of information transmission. 23 Higher values indicate higher quality, and thus less importance of di¤erences in knowledge endowment.
24 21 We also tried to include some measures for "education" and some of the ICRG indicators but missing data reduced the sample substantially, so we do not report the results below. We have also included the KOF Index of Globalization and its subcomponent on economic restrictions (Dreher, 2006b ) and our results are unchanged. Di¤erent speci…cations are available upon request. 22 Fabricious (2007) empirically shows that whenever the Bank and the Fund agree on the boundaries of each other's operations (the so called domain consensus), they tend to speak with one voice. However, the increasing overlap of the mandates of the two organizations over time has ampli…ed the areas of potential con ‡ict, since each institutions tends to exaggerate the importance of their own opinions overlooking the importance of compromise. 23 For more recent years, the availability of internet access might be a better proxy, but the use of this variable would substantially restrict our sample. The number of telephone lines correlates highly with this and other potential measures for the intensity of communication. 24 ing adjustment programs, the stronger the impact on growth of the Bank-Fund simultaneous involvement in a recipient country. 25 In particular, the IMF and the WB's informational advantage will be more relevant for more open countries since multilateral institutions could be an ideal place to internalize spillovers (Rajan, 2008) . We employ the indicators of openness introduced above to test this hypothesis.
Competition or lack of domain consensus. We measure the potential for domain dissent . However, while neither this variables nor its interaction are signi…cant at conventional levels, the results for the remaining variables are unchanged. 25 The informational advantage of a multilateral institution derives from cross-country knowledge it accumulates during its activities.
Privatization, Public Sector, Social, Systemic, Trade and Wages & Pensions. Clearly, these categories are to some extent arbitrary and some of them represent sub-categories of others. 26 Political factors. The role of political factors in explaining the preferential treatment to allies of major shareholders of International Financial Institutions (IFI) is well known. 27 In our analysis we are interested to test how political aspects may a¤ect Bank-Fund cooperation.
On the one hand, if political interferences are "symmetric," it is reasonable to expect that they make the two institutions more willing to …nd an agreement. On the other hand, asymmetric political pressure could jeopardize the cooperation between the IMF and the WB.
We control for whether a country votes (more or less) in line with the United States in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) (or with other "key"shareholders of the IMF and the WB) as proxy of the importance that political factors may have for both IMF and WB intervention, and we interact this variable with a loan granted simultaneously by the IMF and the WB. 28 We also emphasize that politically motivated aid (and WB in the simple analysis of the interaction term we are not actually able to disentangle the e¤ects due to the Bank-Fund interaction from the e¤ects of politically driven loans. 
Empirical results
This section presents two sets of regression results. Table 1 presents the results of the "restricted"speci…cation in equation (2) . First of all we do detect a positive e¤ect on growth of a joint Bank-Fund loan. The disbursement of a simultaneous IMF-WB loan is signi…cant 26 We …nd similar results controlling for the number of conditions in IMF programs. 27 There is substantial empirical evidence linking a country's geopolitical proximity to the Fund's major shareholders with a variety of types of preferential treatment (e.g., 28 Dreher et al. (2008b) and (2009) …nd evidence of a preferential treatment by both the IMF and the WB (respectively) for countries serving on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). More recently, Dreher et al. (2013b) show that the e¤ect of aid on economic growth is reduced by the share of years a country has served on the UNSC in the period the aid has been committed.
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at the ten percent level and substantively important: its increase by one standard deviation increases per capita growth by almost two percent. The …nding of a positive coe¢ cient is reassuring with respect to the (plausible) consequences of the endogeneity of an IMF and WB's program adoption as in this case a downward bias in the estimate of such coe¢ cient is expected.
As far as our variables of interest are concerned, we observe that the coe¢ cient of the interaction between a joint IMF and WB loan with the variable information transmission is positive and signi…cant almost at the 10% level of signi…cance (i.e., 10.5%), which suggests that the positive impact of growth of a joint Bank Fund interaction is increasing with the degree of information transmission. In order to look at the speci…c e¤ect (on growth) of the IMF-WB loan at di¤erent levels of information transmission, we calculated the marginal e¤ects of the interaction (as displayed in Figure 1 ).
The results show that the critical amount of info transmission above which the marginal e¤ect of Bank-Fund loans on growth is positive and signi…cant is about 2.5, which is actually below the sample average value of 5. Therefore, the impact of a joint loan on growth is not signi…cant only for very low values (below 2.5) of info transmission and positive and increasing with information transmission thereafter. This evidence seems to suggest that the more easily the two institutions can gather country-speci…c information, the more bene…cial their joint intervention in a country can become, which is consistent with the theory. Finally, the interaction with voting in line with the US in the UNGA is negative and significant at the 5% level meaning that the e¤ect of Bank-Fund loans on growth is signi…cantly lower when such loans have been disbursed for political reasons. This result is consistent both with previous results of the related literature showing the negative e¤ects of politically motivated aid (Dreher et al. 2013) and also with the possible adverse consequences of politically motivated loan disbursements on the Bank-Fund willingness to cooperate. 29 Finally, as can be seen most explanatory variables have the expected impact on growth.
Growth rates signi…cantly increases with lower initial GDP and with lower fertility rates.
While GDP growth increase with higher investments, and higher scores of the CPIA index, as expected. The coe¢ cients of both life expectancy and democracy are not signi…cant. Table 2 presents the results of the "full" speci…cation in equation (3) . We can observe that while the e¤ects on growth of the adoption of either an IMF or a WB loan has a negative impact on growth, the coe¢ cient of the variable denoting their simultaneous presence is positive and larger than the …rst one, which is consistent with our previous results. We then …nd similar results both considering the variables of interests and the explanatory variables.
As the variables of interest are concerned, the main di¤erence is related to the sign of the interaction of the bank-Fund loan with information transmission, which is now signi…cantly negative rather than positive. However, calculating the marginal e¤ects of both interactions (disbursements of either an IMF or WB loan and disbursement of both types of loans) with info transmission we …nd that neither of them is signi…cant for "reasonable" values of the variable info transmission (see …gure 4 and 5). 29 We have also included the interaction of a joint Fund-Bank's loan with the dummy for temporary UNSC membership. While neither the dummy nor the interaction are signi…cant at conventional levels, the results for the remaining variables are unchanged. 24 
Conclusions
Despite a series of o¢ cial agreements aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation, it is widely believed that coordination between the two organizations often falls short of what should be rationally expected. However, a greater pressure for conformity, required by the need of coordination, may contrast with the objective of enhancing policy adaptation to the speci…c conditions revealed by each institution's specialized expertise.
In this paper we present a theoretical model which, focusing on the quality of information transmission between the IMF and the WB, analyzes the impact of di¤erent governance structures on the trade o¤ between responding to local conditions (i.e., improving adaptation) and the need of enhancing consistency of policy actions (i.e., improving coordination). We compare the performance of a decentralized governance structure with that of a centralized one. A centralized structure better addresses the necessity of coordinating decisions, but a greater consistency between the Bank and the Fund policy actions will be achieved at the expenses of a less satisfactory adaptation to local conditions. We …nd that a decentralized structure is to be preferred only when the need for coordination is very low. On the contrary, when the need for coordination is relevant, a centralized governance allows to achieve a level of overall payo¤s greater than those of a decentralized one.
In the real world the governance structure of the two institutions is de…nitely decentralized.
A testable implication of the model would then be to see whether Bank-Fund's coordination is really important for their impact on recipient countries. Consistently with Marchesi and Sirtori (2011), we …nd that Bank-Fund joint intervention is bene…cial to growth and, more importantly, such bene…cial e¤ect is increasing with the availability of the country's speci…c information (which decreases the asymmetry of information between the two institutions), with the importance of the multilaterals'knowledge (which increases the importance of Bank-Fund's coordination) and with the scope of IMF's conditionality (which makes communication easier for the two institutions). This evidence would then be in favor of a (more) centralized governance. Our results are in line with the general wisdom that centralization must be preferred when the need for coordination is relevant, and it supports the reform proposals which have favorably looked at a possible merger between the two institutions. 30 Finally, the paper could be extended in three directions. First of all, we emphasize that the better performance of the centralized governance is mainly due to our assumption of "fully sel…sh" institutions, which systematically overlook the impact of their actions on the other 30 See for example, Clark (1990) ; Crook (1991) ; Shultz (1998); Burnham (1999) and Fischer (2004) . 25 organization's payo¤. As a consequence, their policy choices will result always "too distant" with respect to the …rst best and this circumstance more than o¤sets the better adaptation to local conditions that a decentralized structure could in principle achieve. Therefore, we plan to extend our model analyzing what happens when this assumption is (at least slightly) relaxed (as it is in ADM). More speci…cally, we expect to …nd that the introduction of some incentive alignments between the two organizations would ameliorate the performance of a decentralized governance making it a more desirable option. 31 A further extension of our basic framework is related to the issue of the acquisition of costly information. In the framework of coordination games based on cheap talk communication, the specialized information privately owned by agents is generally assumed to have been costlessly collected. However, when the acquisition of specialized information is costly, agents must balance the cost of information acquisition against its bene…ts. In our framework the bene…ts are only related to the improved adaptation to local conditions. Thus, it would be interesting to analyze the impact that di¤erent governance may have on the agents'incentive to invest in acquiring informative signals.
Finally, we plan to analyze the case of asymmetric interdependency. Indeed, as many authors have emphasized, the Fund seems to be less inclined to coordination than the Bank. For example, Fabricious (2007) has argued that while the WB'structural adjustment loans (SALs) and project lending may await the borrower's agreement with the Fund, the IMF's stand by negotiations have generally been independent from the Bank'opinion 32 Moreover, the WB has often argued that a structural adjustment program would fail without consistent macroeconomic policies designed to correct external equilibrium misadjustments. Therefore, an asymmetric setting will be more useful in order to investigate the di¤erent (relative) importance of adaptation and coordination for the two institutions. We leave these questions for future research. 31 For example, the ability to work in team with the other organization's sta¤ members could become a criterion to employ new people for both institutions. 32 The withholding of Fund's credit may a¤ect a member's budget enough to disrupt …nancing for a Bank's supported project, but not vice versa. Table 1 ). The dashed line shows the 95%-confidence interval. (Table 1 ). The dashed line shows the 95%-confidence interval. Table 1 ). The dashed line shows the 95%-confidence interval. Table 1 ). The dashed line shows the 95%-confidence interval. Table 2 ). The dashed line shows the 95%-confidence interval. 
